Some Final Thoughts, and Thanks

I will be flying back to Chicago tonight so am frantically packing my things. But in light of the busyness of this last week, I wanted to wrap up this blog with a post that reviews some of what I found during the last few months and thanks everyone who helped along the way.

I flew to India more than ten months ago under the impression that my research would be primarily focused on sampling methods. This is in part because over the previous three years I spent a lot of time sitting in meetings and holding discussions about the challenges of acquiring representative samples, whether sample demographics matched the population’s demographics, how to improve sampling methods, etc.

What became clear to me over the first few weeks and months of my research is that this is a problem that many people have already thought extensively about. When it comes to making sure the demographics of one’s sample matches those of the population one is sampling, survey research organizations have some tried and true methods of trying to reach those harder-to-reach populations. They have good data on the demographics of the population they are working with, with the noteworthy exception of caste. When sample demographics don’t match those of the population, as will happen inevitably with some variables, they weight the data.

Furthermore, one can make generalizations about the challenges of sampling a particular population only insofar as that population has some amount of uniformity. The challenge of speaking about India is that it is a teeming multitude of populations. With 1.3 billion people spread out across 29 states and 7 union territories speaking 22 official languages (and hundreds of unofficial ones), India is more than just a country. It is a subcontinent that is home to one sixth of humanity, the most radical democratic experiment in history.

So the notion that there are certain challenges to polling India is useful only up until the point where one comes into contact with India’s variegated realities. I had the good fortune of coming into contact with just a few of these realities in my ten months here: different neighborhoods in downtown Patnaa Bodo village on the outskirts of Guwahatia working class neighborhood in west Delhi, a mid-sized town and its surrounding villages in Tamil Nadua Muslim village on the outskirts of a major city in West Bengal, a comfortable suburb on the outskirts of Thiruvananthapuram, among others. These environments all had their own unique challenges for the field researchers who were sent to question designated respondents. Their knowledge of that environment and ability to navigate it proved critical in their ability to complete interviews successfully.

Here are some examples of how field researchers dealt with (or were unable to deal with) such challenges:

1. Gender

In both West Guwahati assembly constituency of Assam and Bolpur constitutency of West Bengal, female respondents were rarely interviewed in isolation. Their husbands or fathers frequently observed the interviews and would often start answering the questions for their wives/daughters. Field investigators would try to direct questions back to the respondent, but the respondent would often defer towards her husband or father, especially for questions related to abstract issues, such as ideology, or current affairs.

2. Caste

In the villages around Usilampatti, where intercaste violence between backwards castes and Dalits has been frequent, field investigators must know which villages have been flashpoints of such violence. In such villages, it is not safe for field researchers to even ask about the caste of respondents, as it may threaten their safety to raise the topic. Caste is a standard demographic variable included in all surveys, and so field investigators need to exercise a great deal of judgment about when and where to ask about it.

3. Language / ethnicity

Visiting a village on the outskirts of Guwahati that is home to Bodos and Rabhas, field investigators who spoke Assamese and Bengali were only able to interview the residents of the village who spoke Assamese. For the remainder of the village’s residents who spoke only Bodo and Rabha, the investigators were not able to complete interviews. Most of the selected respondents from the village could thus not be interviewed. Field investigators did not feel safe in the village and continued to the next polling station in the constituency.

4. Religion

In Ruppur, a village around Bolpur in West Bengal, residents in the Muslim section of the village expressed a great deal of hesitation and skepticism about participating in the survey. “Rajniti [politics],” one resident said, with disdain. Field investigators had to diligently explain that the surveys they were conducting were confidential and not for any political party or group. After the first few interviews, village residents became more comfortable with the interviews. This initial hesitation and skepticism was not encountered in the Hindu section of the village.

This experience was very different from field researchers conducting interviews in the Muslim section of Palikkal, a village about 50 km from Kerala’s capital, Thiruvananthapuram. Though many residents were not home, those who were welcomed the field investigators to the house and did not show much initial hesitance to answering questions about the upcoming elections.

5. Urban and rural settings

In neighborhoods of cities and larger towns, whether they were Delhi, Guwahati, Bolpur, or Nemom, many selected respondents were not home at the time of the field investigators’ visit because they were at their jobs in different parts of the city. If someone else was at the home, field investigators would try to set up a time to return and complete the interview. But the limited amount of time they had — somewhere between two to four days to complete all their interviews — meant that field investigators often had to make judgment calls about whether or not to return to the household and re-attempt the interview.

Furthermore, navigating urban neighborhoods to find the households of selected respondents nearly always proved to be challenging. Field investigators would ask other respondents, shopkeepers, and neighborhood residents about the addresses and names of those who were selected for interview, but people often did not know so well the names of all people in their neighborhood. This was especially the case in Bolpur and Nemom; in Usilampatti, respondents were more likely to identify names and addresses in their neighborhood. Field investigators had to make a judgment about how much effort to expend locating households in one particular neighborhood before moving onto the next neighborhood.

In small villages, such as Ruppur or the Bodo village on the outskirts of Guwahati, respondents were much more likely to know the names and locations of selected respondents. In the case of Ruppur, a group of young men led the field investigators around the village to each listed respondent. On the other hand, in Palikkal (also a small village) field investigators struggled to complete many interviews since village residents were less familiar with the names and addresses of selected respondents in the area.

Transportation to villages often proved a logistical obstacle to completing more interviews. An expensive rickshaw ride was required to go from Bolpur to Ruppur, for example (the rickshaw driver looked with puzzlement at the field investigators when they said this was where they wanted to go). Work had to be cut short earlier in the afternoon in order to catch the last bus back to Bolpur. Field investigators had to be familiar with bus schedules to ensure that they could arrive in the village and return to their home or hostel before dark.

6. Class

In one village outside of Usilampatti, many of the village’s residents were unemployed agricultural workers who earned a living from the MGNREGA scheme. Field investigators went to the field where the villagers were working and started completing interviews, but were disrupted by a panchayat (local government) clerk who told the villagers not to answer any questions. One field investigator talked to the clerk, explaining why the survey was being conducted and presenting him with the official letter from CSDS, but the clerk insisted that the field investigators leave.

Many of the selected respondents in villages around Usilampatti had left to work in larger towns and cities around Tamil Nadu. In Nemom, it was also the case that several selected respondents had left their homes and were presently working jobs in the Middle East. Field investigators were not able to interview any of these selected respondents.

7. Education

Respondents with lower levels of education often struggled to comprehend many of the questions in the questionnaire, especially those related to current events. However, some could hardly understand any of the questions beyond which party they had supported or would be supporting in the election. Some respondents in Bolpur and Ruppur who were supporters of Trinamool Congress merely answered, “Trinamool,” for all questions, even those for which “Trinamool” was not an option or for which the response “Trinamool” would convey something negative about the party. Field investigators had to make a judgment about whether respondents really meant to convey a negative impression about Trinamool or simply did not understand the question. This was a challenge encountered by field investigators working in the villages around Usilampatti as well. Many of the selected respondents simply did not understand the content of questions. One old woman asked, “Who is Modi?” for one of the questions about the central government’s welfare schemes. Field investigators therefore had to make decisions about whether it made sense to ask all questions in the questionnaire, when it was clear from the initial section of the interview that the respondent hardly understood the content of questions.


As has become clear from interviews with researchers, there are national level trends when it comes to challenges of survey research in India, and the practitioners of surveys who have been conducting them for decades (VB Singh, Yogendra Yadav, Sanjay Kumar, Yashwant Deshmukh, and Dhananjai Joshi) are well familiar with them: lower response rates among Dalits, Muslims, and tribal populations; challenges in reaching female respondents, particularly Muslim female respondents; and lower response rates in urban neighborhoods. As Yogendra Yadav succinctly explained: 

Random sample with a reasonably large size gets you everything. But anything other than random sample almost invariably oversamples again the more articulate, the more well-to-do, men, urban. The slope of privileges is such that sampling tends to flow in the direction of socioeconomically more powerful groups: rich, men, urban, upper caste, media-exposed, educated. And since all of these, except the gender, has a significant correlation with each other upon another, there is a very substantial overrepresentation of one section of society.

My point in explicating the examples above is to illustrate how the challenges of conducting survey research in India are not limited to these general trends. They are the beginning rather than the end of obstacles faced by those conducting surveys in India (I did not even touch on the all-important issue of funding, nor the issue of pressures that comes from media and other clients), and the examples above hopefully illustrate how obstacles are highly localized and unique to each and every environment. In order to navigate them, field investigators must be conscious of the challenges in their assigned environments and capable of navigating them competently. Retention of experienced field staff who are passionate about the work they are doing is therefore a must.

In light of the highly localized challenges of conducting survey research in India, researchers might want to think about how the design of questionnaires can be done in a way that integrates local knowledge more extensively. I don’t mean that questionnaires should be put to a vote and of course understand the precious value of real estate on questionnaires. But perhaps the mechanisms by which local knowledge flows up to those designing the questionnaire at the highest levels can be re-examined. This might be especially helpful in the case of states that tend to be more outside the expertise of north Indian researchers. From my viewpoint in Delhi, where all of my three research affiliates were based, it was the South and Northeast where more inputs from people in the states might have expanded our ability to understand the results of the Assam, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu elections. The questions we ask are, after all, the ones that define our analysis.


This research would not have been possible without the support, encouragement, and contributions of so many people.

From my old employer D3 Systems, thanks to David Jodice, Matthew Warshaw, Sandra Newman, and David Peng for their encouragement towards pursuing this project and their recommendations. I am also grateful to my former professor and thesis supervisor, Samer Shehata, for his recommendation.

From the United States-India Educational Foundation, thanks to Adam Grotsky, Neeraj Goswami, Priyanjana Ghosh, Pavitra Soram, and Kalden Shringla for their guidance and support.

Thank you to everyone who sat down for an interview: Rajdeep Sardesai, Rukmini S, Dhananjai JoshiRajeeva KarandikarYashwant DeshmukhPraveen Rai, Yogendra YadavVB Singh, Sanjay Kumar, and Mukulika Banerjee.

From Impetus Research, thanks to Ankur Aggarwal, Raghavendra Srivastava, Anil Kumar Jha, Rajni Singh, and Krishna Shahi.

From CVoter, thank you very much to Shalinder Mahjan, Shaleja, SK, Abdul Menon, Ajit Shukla, and everyone else at the Noida office. Thanks especially to Yashwant Deshmukh, who was generous with his time and allowed me to peer inside the guts of his organization in a way that commercial pollsters rarely allow.

From the CSDS-Lokniti network around the country, thanks to Dhruba Pratim Sharma, Meenakshi, Vashwati Das, Jyoti Prasad Chatterjee, Suprio Basu, Biswajit Prasad, Shaw Chandan, KM Sajad Ibrahim, Sandeep Shastri, Rajeena Aysha, Anuja, Arya, Sukanya, P. Rama Jayam, Ranith, Thanalakshmi, Pechi, and Kajinder for help with logistics and letting me follow your work.

Most of all, thank you to everyone at the Lokniti office in Delhi: Asmita Aasaavari, Dhananjay Kumar Singh, Vibha Attri, Jyoti Mishra, Shreyas Sardesai, Nitin Mehta, Arushi Gupta, Himanshu Bhattacharya, Pranav Gupta, Rahul Verma, and of course Sanjay Kumar. These people are truly at the forefront of thinking about Indian politics, and I have learned more from them in ten months than I ever could have expected.

Thank you, reader, for taking an interest in this research.

I will be back. Until next time, this is Polling One Billion, signing off.

Lokniti

Lokniti-CSDS

Cvoter

Team CVoter

 

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Analysis of CSDS Tamil Nadu pre-poll in Indian Express

Today’s Indian Express has the Lokniti-CSDS analysis of the pre-poll conducted in Tamil Nadu. The leading article by Rahul Verma and P. Ramajayam examines the pivotal role of women in Chief Minister Jayalalithaa’s victory. Here’s the key takeaway:

The comparative credibility of leadership seems to have acquired a gender dimension in Tamil Nadu. Women voters delivered a decisive verdict in favour of Jayalalithaa and her party.

While the turnout was 73% for both male and female voters, there were 4 lakh more registered women voters than men. Survey data suggest that women voters rallied behind Jayalalithaa in greater numbers than ever before. The AIADMK led the DMK alliance by 10 percentage points among women voters and, thus, Jayalalithaa’s party drew its votes from the bigger share of the pie. Her party has had an advantage among women voters earlier, but the gap has never been this stark and large.

More women than men found Jayalalithaa a better administrator. They perceived her as caring more for them and for the poor than DMK chief M Karunanidhi. Compared to men, women voters were also less likely to think the AIADMK government was corrupt, the data show; on the other hand, they were more likely to think of Karunandhi as very corrupt. Women voters in comparison to men were more likely to give another chance to the AIADMK. This pattern is replicated across caste, class, and other demographic variables.

Links to all articles below:

On the role of women in Jayalalithaa’s victory by Rahul Verma and P. Ramajayam

On why the DMK fell short by Sam Solomon

On the poor showing of the People’s Welfare Front by Pranav Gupta

On the popularity of prohibition in Kerala and Tamil Nadu by Vibha Attri and Jyoti Mishra

Analysis of CSDS Kerala pre-poll in Indian Express

Today’s Indian Express has the Lokniti-CSDS analysis of the pre-poll conducted in Kerala. The headline article by Rahul Verma, Pranav Gupta, and Nitin Mehta examines the reasons for the BJP’s emergence in Kerala. Here’s they key takeaway:

…the BJP is cutting into the support base of both coalitions [LDF and UDF]. The upper-caste Nairs have remained the nucleus of BJP’s social coalition in Kerala and the party in this election received more votes among this section than the UDF. The BJP’s alliance with SNDP (a social organisation of Ezhavas), however, has not resulted in the desired effects. The Ezhavas are a numerically dominant backward-caste community and represent almost half of the state’s Hindu population. The BJP’s support among the community increased by merely five percentage points in comparison to the Lok Sabha election. Even among the Ezhavas, who reported to be associated with the SNDP, the NDA was far behind the two alliances.

The BJP’s vote share among the Dalits has increased significantly in this election. In fact, the BJP and the UDF won equally among the Dalits, who have historically remained aligned with the LDF. The survey data also suggests that the BJP has succeeded in winning a small segment of Christian voters. Does this development indicate a formation of a new social coalition in Kerala? Can Rajagopal replicate BJP’s Goa model where Manohar Parikkar built a coalition around upper-caste Hindus and Christians? Will the BJP succeed in making further inroads in Kerala?

In the past, the BJP’s success in new frontiers like Karnataka, Haryana, Jammu and most recently in Assam is in large part due to the en-masse transfer of a regional party’s support base. The prospect of this option looks bleak in Kerala and thus the BJP needs to prepare for another round of struggle in the state. The party’s vote share is still a few percentage points below the threshold point beyond which it could start making substantial gains in terms of seats.

Links to all articles below:

On the BJP’s emergence in Kerala by Rahul Verma, Pranav Gupta, and Nitin Mehta

On why the LDF win was unlike previous elections by Sandeep Shastri and KM Sajad Ibrahim

On the nuanced perspective of leftist voters by Hilal Ahmed

Analysis of CSDS West Bengal post-poll in Indian Express

Today’s Indian Express has the Lokniti-CSDS analysis of the post-poll conducted in West Bengal. The headline article co-authored by myself and Professor Jyoti Prasad Chatterjee of Barrackpore Rastraguru Surendranath College examines what went wrong with the Left-Congress alliance. Here’s the key takeaway:

The Assembly elections tested whether a ‘jote’, or alliance, between the Left Front, led by the CPI(M), and the Congress could successfully uproot the Trinamool Congress (TMC) government in West Bengal. That experiment clearly failed. The Lokniti-CSDS post-poll analysis reveals that in contrast to the ‘mahagathbandhan’ in Bihar or the BJP-AGP-BPF combine in Assam, the chemistry of a Left-Congress alliance was not conducive to electoral victory in West Bengal. Insofar as the alliance did succeed, it worked more to Congress’s benefit than the Left’s.

…The fundamental weakness of the Left-Congress ‘jote’ was simple: voters vote differently in state elections than national elections because issues of state governance are different from issues of national governance. The 2014 elections were defined by a debate about development and change at the national level. By contrast, these elections were largely a referendum on the performance of Mamata Banerjee’s TMC government. Fifty-seven per cent of voters were satisfied with the performance of the TMC government, while only 33 per cent were dissatisfied. Among this dissatisfied third, the Left-Congress ‘jote’ won only 65 per cent of votes, indicating that many anti-TMC voters did not think it presented a credible alternative to the TMC.

While the Left’s votes largely transferred to Congress, Congress’s votes did not transfer as consistently to the Left. Among those who voted for the Left Front in 2014, 88 per cent voted for the ‘jote’ while only 9 per cent voted for TMC in 2016. But among those who voted for Congress in 2014, 73 per cent voted for the ‘jote’ and 24 per cent voted for TMC. This lopsided transfer of votes helped Congress win more seats than the Left Front and emerge as the next leader of the opposition.

Links to all articles below:

On what went wrong with the Left-Congress alliance by Sam Solomon and Jyoti Prasad Chatterjee

On the popularity of Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee by Jyoti Mishra and Aasmita Aasaavari

On the loss of the Left’s base to the TMC by Shreyas Sardesai and Suprio Basu

On the relative insignificance of corruption as a political issue by Vibha Attri and Souradeep Banerjee

On the BJP’s disappointing returns by Pranav Gupta, Shashwat Dhar, and Nitin Mehta

Analysis of CSDS Assam post-poll in Indian Express

Today’s Indian Express has the Lokniti-CSDS analysis of the post-poll conducted in Assam. The headline article by Sanjay Kumar, Suhas Palshikar, and Sandeep Shastri reviews the meaning of all four election results for national politics. Here’s the key takeaway:

…these election outcomes yet again underscore the importance of state-level political configurations. Not just the fact that in almost each of these four states, state level players made all the difference, but also the nature of competition, its impact on various players, filtering of the national appeals and images, and the social bases that allowed victories and produces losses, are all state-specific. This is what the BJP ignored in case of Bihar and made amends this time around. As we move away from the Modi magic of 2014, this crucial reality would be a major factor in shaping the electoral arena. More importantly, this means that challenge to the BJP can arise mainly from state-based parties — something that ties up with the inevitability of coalitions.

…in spite of its limited success in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, this round of Assembly elections further underscores the rise of BJP as the only truly all-India party. Already in 2014, it had nearly achieved that status, but a robust performance in East and South further strengthens this feature. It took a long time for any party to finally emerge as an all-India party in the wake of the decline of Congress that began in 1989.

…this outcome will be remembered for probably the last leg in the downhill journey of the Congress party. In 2014, it was felt that that was the lowest that the party can stumble. But past two years have shown the depths of its downfall. Both in Assam and in Kerala, it is not extra-ordinary that it lost; but the scale of loss and, more than that, the style in which it lost — bickering, aimless and isolated — makes this outcome another important milestone in the irresistible decline of the Congress party.

Links to all articles on Assam below:

On the unprecedented level of Hindu consolidation for the BJP by Shreyas Sardesai and Dhruba Pratim Sharma

On the BJP’s alliances with regional parties by Sam Solomon

On the BJP’s success among Scheduled Tribe voters by Shreyas Sardesai

On Congress’ decision to not align with the AIUDF by Sanjeer Alam

Kerala and Tamil Nadu Pre-Poll Observation

Today is Election Day in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Originally, I was planning to write an election guide for each of the state elections going on right now. But time has not allowed for it. I will be heading back to the United States in less than two weeks and am starting to wrap up my research here. Where has the time gone?!

I spent the last week travelling through these two southern states to observe fieldwork for the ongoing CSDS pre-poll election studies. Unlike for Assam and West Bengal, these studies were being fielded before election day because of the quick turnaround on analysis. In both states, but particularly in Kerala, signs of the imminent elections were everywhere. Billboards and posters for the governing United Democratic Front (UDF) competed for space with the challenging Left Democratic Front (LDF). The BJP also had established a strong campaign presence in the capital of Thiruvananthapuram and the surrounding areas. In Tamil Nadu, I saw fewer campaign posters, particularly in the cities of Madurai and Chennai. In the villages surrounding Madurai, however, the two-leaf symbol of the governing Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) and the rising sun symbol of the challenging Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) decorated the walls of houses. Flags from the All India Forward Bloc (AIFB), which won the constituency I was visiting in 2011, were also in abundance. By the roadside, streamers with pictures of Jayalaalithaa, Tamil Nadu’s chief minister, or Karunanidhi, her rival from the DMK, hung from different campaign rally sites.

Like my previous post, a concise summary of the field visit is will be presented here rather than an extended narration.

On May 5, I flew down to Thiruvananthapuram by way of Chennai and checked into the guesthouse at the University of Kerala campus in Kazhakuttom. On May 6, I observed the full-day training for Kerala field investigators at the University of Kerala. Sandeep Shastri, National Coordinator of the Lokniti Network and Pro Vice Chancellor at Jain University in Bangalore, led the training. On May 7, I met up with two field investigators working in Nemom, a suburb that is 8 km south of Thiruvananthapuram city center (the assembly constitutency of Nemom was won by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPM, in 2011). We met up late in the afternoon, around 4 PM, and so I only observed one interview since so many listed respondents were not home. On May 8, I met up with two other field investigators working in the village of Pallikkal, which is about 40 km north from Kazhakuttom in the assembly constitutency of Varkala (which was won by the Indian National Congress in 2011). Like the day before, we met late in the day — close to 4 PM — and so I could only observe two interviews. Like in Nemom, many of the selected respondents were not home at the time of our visit.

On May 9, I travelled by overnight train, the Ananthapuri Express, from Thiruvananthapuram to Madurai in Tamil Nadu. Madurai is the third largest city in Tamil Nadu, home to the legendary Meenakshi Amman temple complex. On May 10, I met up with four field investigators working in the area around Usilampatti, a town that is 40 km west of Madurai. I observed the work of FIs interviewing respondents in the countryside villages surrounding Usilampatti: Nallathathunayakkappatti, Sangakavundanppatti, Palaiyur, Karisalpatti, and Kattarripatti. On May 11, I squeezed in a morning visit to the Meenakshi Amman temple of Madurai before joining the FIs conducting in the city of Usilampatti. The assembly constituency of Usilampatti was won by the All India Forward Bloc (AIFB) in 2011. I took an overnight train, the Ananthapuri Express once again, from Madurai and arrived in Chennai on the morning of May 12. In the morning, I ate breakfast at Saravana Bhavan, visited the museum at Fort St. George, and stopped by Higgenbothams Booksellers and Stationers before heading to the airport and flying back to Delhi.

  1. Urban vs. rural areas: As with Assam and West Bengal, respondents in urban areas were more difficult to locate than respondents in rural areas. People on the street and in the neighborhoods of selected respondents were less likely to know the location of other selected respondents in urban areas than in rural areas. This meant that a lot of the time for fieldwork in urban areas (especially Menom) was spent asking people on the street if they know the location of selected respondents and walking around to identify households. In villages, particularly in village centres where older men gather, people were much more likely to identify the names of selected respondents and point us towards their houses.
  2. Low response rate in Kerala: Both researchers from the CSDS office in Delhi and the Lokniti coordinator for Kerala, Professor Sajad Ibrahim Ali, informed me that historically the response rate for Kerala is lower than that of other Indian states. This has been the case in state and national election studies, and as the data were being collected for this election study, Professor Ibrahim informed me that it would also be the case this time. Several team members from Kerala informed me that response rates are higher in north Kerala than in south Kerala, and particularly in Theruvananthapuram and the surrounding areas. No one had a clear answer about why this is. Some field investigators speculated that it had to do with the number of people working who were not home during the day. On my two admittedly short observations of fieldwork, field investigators experienced challenges locating houses and arranging interviews with the selected respondents once they had located the households.
  3. Caste in Tamil Nadu: Ranith, one of the field investigators whom I was observing, informed me that caste was a very sensitive issue in many of the villages around Usilampatti. The Lokniti state coordinator for Tamil Nadu, Professor P Ramajayam said, also said that Usilampatti is notorious for intercaste violence. Violent caste-related incidents in Tamil Nadu are most common between different backwards classes, such as Gounders and Vanniyars, and Scheduled Castes (SC) or dalits. In some of the villages we visited, it was dangerous for field investigators to even raise the issue or ask questions about it (every CSDS election study includes demographic questions about caste). For some interviews, the field investigators would therefore skip any such questions in the questionnaire. Field investigators in Tamil Nadu have to carefully navigate the complexities and sensitivities of caste while collecting data. That all four field investigators were from Usilampatti and the surrounding villages was critical, as they knew which villages it was safe to ask about caste.
  4. Religion: While Tamil Nadu is a state with a large (88%) Hindu majority, Kerala is a state with sizable Muslim and Christian minorities (54% Hindu, 27% Muslim, 18% Christian). The field investigators whom I observed in Kerala expressed skepticism that response rate was different across religion, though they said it was sometimes harder to speak with women in Muslim households (all the field investigators with whom I worked in Kerala were female). Though the neighborhood we were interviewing in Pallikkal was largely Muslim, I did not spend enough time in the field in Kerala to receive an informed impression about how religion shapes fieldwork in Kerala.
  5. Gender: The gendered dynamics of interviews which I observed in Assam and West Bengal were not as much in evidence in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. That is to say, while female respondents who were selected were nearly always interviewed in the presence of their father or husband in Assam and West Bengal, this did not seem to be the case in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. However, any difference may be due to the fact that the interviews I observed with female respondents in Kerala and Tamil Nadu were all conducted by female interviewers; in West Bengal, the interviewers whom I observed were male. In Tamil Nadu, the team of field investigators included two male FIs and two female FIs. This was for the safety of female FIs when traveling through villages in the countryside. It also allowed for male FIs to interview male respondents and female FIs to interview female respondents.
  6. Education level: For a number of respondents in Usilampatti and the surrounding areas, education level was so low that respondents could not understand the content of many of the questions. One respondent, for example, responded to a question about Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s different government initiative by saying that she did not know who Narendra Modi is. Field investigators thus had to make spur-of-the-moment judgments about which questions to ask and which could not be reasonably asked of the respondents. In the case of illiterate respondents who lacked even basic knowledge about political affairs in Tamil Nadu and India, the focus was on collecting correct demographic data and ensuring that the respondent answered the question about voting intention.
  7. Timing: Many of the respondents in Nemom, Pallikkal, Usilampatti, and the surrounding villages of Usilampatti were not home during the daytime because they were at their jobs. In the case of villages around Usilampatti, there was one village for which all or most of the villagers were out in a field working under the MGNREGA (Mohandas Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act). We went to the field to find the villagers assembled in the shade of the trees. When the FIs began conducting interviews with selected respondents, a village clerk from the panchayat (local administration) showed up and demanded that the interviews cease. The local official told the villagers not to answer any questions being asked by survey researchers. The FIs tried talking to the clerk and showed them their official CSDS letter, but the clerk insisted that we leave. This incident showed how field investigators sometimes must deal with obstacles presented by local government. It also illustrated how unemployed workers receiving benefits through MNREGA (which guarantees 100 days of agricultural work a year) may be less likely to be interviewed for surveys.
  8. Economic migration: Many of the selected respondents who were not available in the villages surrounding Usilampatti had left their village to work in either a larger city of Tamil Nadu or another state like Kerala. Such economic migration meant that many selected respondents in a given village could not be interviewed.

My pictures below. Unfortunately, my phone failed me on the date of May 6 so I lost pictures from the training workshop at the University of Kerala. What was perhaps most visually striking in Tamil Nadu was the placement of beautiful towering temples with elaborate carvings in village centres, even in the tiniest and poorest of villages.

Counting Day is only three days away. CSDS should have some analysis in the papers following the announcement of the election results.


May 7 (Nemom, Kerala)

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Billboards for the United Democratic Front and National Democratic Alliance, over graffiti for the Communist Party of India (Marxist)

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Picking jasmine

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Graffiti for the Indian National Congress / United Democratic FrontIMG_20160507_174525


May 8 (Pallikkal, Kerala)

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University of Kerala campus in Kazhakootam

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Pallikkal

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May 9 (Kazhakootam to Madurai)

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With Rajeena at the University of Kerala canteen

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Aboard the Ananthapuri Express


May 10 (Villages around Usilampatti, Tamil Nadu)

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Tamil dailies report on the election

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In the Dalit section of a village

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Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) posters

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The two leaves are the symbol for the ADMK

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The sun rising between the mountains symbol of the DMK

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Ranith, Thanalakshmi, and Pechi


May 11 (Madurai and Usilampatti, Tamil Nadu)

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At the Meenakshi Amman temple

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Golden Lotus Tank

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Lord Ganesha

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A model of the temple complex

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Dancing Shiva and Parvati

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In the Thousand Pillar Hall

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Usilampatti bus station

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Interviews in Usilampatti

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With Ram’s grandmother

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Downtown Madurai


May 12 (Chennai)

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Fort St. George museum

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Higginbotham’s Booksellers, oldest bookstore in India

A Guide to the 2016 Assam Elections

 In April and May, four different states (Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal) and one union territory (Puducherry) are going to the polls to elect new legislative assemblies. Below is a brief guide to the Assam assembly elections. For more information on these elections, please see Pranav Gupta’s overview as well as Sandhya Goswami’s and Vikas Tripathi 2015 EPW article, both of which were consulted for this guide. Uddipana Goswami’s Conflict and Reconciliation: The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam provides a definitive overview of the many dimensions of ethnic conflict in Assam’s colonial and post-colonial history, while Sandhya’s Goswami’s 2003 Journal of School of Political Economy article provides a definitive review of Assam’s political parties.

Assam’s politics are a direct reflection of the state’s uniqueness. Tucked away in India’s northeast, the state is a melting pot of cultural and ethnic identities. It has struggled with separatist violence, religious and ethnic tensions, and debates about the autonomy and independence of its many tribal populations. At the same time, Assam is a state that is developing rapidly and defies simple generalizations.

Like many previous elections, this election will fuse questions over Assam’s ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity with tensions over tribal issues and illegal immigration from Bangladesh. A Congress-led government that has held office for fifteen years will be fighting against feelings of anti-incumbency. The BJP will try to notch its first win in a state election in over a year, and post its first victory ever as a coalition leader in east Indian state politics.

This election will be a contest between three main electoral players: the Congress-UPP alliance, the BJP-BPF-AGP alliance, and the AIUDF-JD(U)-RJD allianceBecause this is the only one of the four upcoming elections in which the BJP could displace a Congress government, it will probably be the election most closely watched by the national media in Delhi.


  • What is Assam?

At 31.2 million people, Assam is the largest state in northeastern India. Its capital is Dispur, and its largest city is Guwahati. Assam is well-known for its tea and silk, which are the state’s largest exports.

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The state of Assam includes many different tribal populations; twelve percent are categorized as Scheduled Tribes (STs), which qualifies them for targeted benefits related to employment and education.Various movements, peaceful and militant, have occurred in Assam’s post-independent history to demand greater autonomy and sometimes complete independence for different ethnic and tribal groups. Such independence movements during the 1960s to 1980s produced a new set of small states in the Northeast: Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Mizoram. Indeed, for decades Assam had its own armed separatist movement, the United Liberation Forces of Assam (ULFA), which laid down its arms in 2011 after an agreement with the Assamese and Indian governments.

Not all movements have called for full independence. The Bodos, who make up more than 40% of Assam’s ST population, led a movement in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s that resulted in greater autonomy through the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) that was established in 2003. While the Bodos are the most prominent, several other tribes have won concessions of autonomous governing councils from the central and state governments.

As a neighbor of Bangladesh, Assam has regularly received large inflows of Bangladeshi migrants throughout its history. Considerable tensions have generally surrounded this migration. The Assam Movement, or Assam Agitation, which occurred from 1979 to 1985 was the most organized outbreak of such tensions. The All Assam Students Union (AASU) led protests and demonstrations against undocumented Bangladeshis immigrants demanding that migrants be expelled from the state. This movement came to a head on January 19, 1983, when more than 2,000 Bengali Muslims were massacred in one of the worst pogroms in Indian history. The movement ended in 1985 with the Assam Agreement between the AASU and the government of India, after which the AASU became the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and entered party politics. The AGP won the 1986 and 1996 state elections, governing from 1986 to 1991 and 1996 to 2001.

Muslims constitute the largest religious minority in Assam. According to the 2011 census, 34% of residents were Muslim, the largest of any state outside of Jammu and Kashmir. This population includes Assamese Muslims, Bengali Muslims (i.e., originally from West Bengal), and Bangladeshi Muslims. Because nearly all migrants that have arrived from Bangladesh are Muslim, nativist movements are often inflected with religious overtones. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for example, has stated that all Muslim Bangladeshi migrants will be expelled from Assam during previous campaign trips to the state. On a recent campaign stop, he said that if a BJP government was elected, a fenced border will be built by December 2016 to keep out Muslim Bangladeshi migrants.

Language has also been as another key point of tension throughout Assam’s history. In 1960, the Assamese Official Language Act was passed, making Assamese the sole official language of the state. This act has never been fully implemented however. While Assamese is the official language of much of the state, it is not in three districts of the state in the Barak Valley, where Bengali is the official language. In the four districts of the Bodoland Territorial Council, Bodo is another official language. The Language Act of 1960 has therefore been the subject of much public debate, with some calling for repeal of the law in contrast to others calling for its full implementation.

According to data from the 2011 Assam assembly elections survey, Assamese-speaking Hindus constitute 31% of Assam’s population, Assamese-speaking Muslims constitute 9%, Bengali-speaking Hindus constitute 10%, and Bengali-speaking Muslims constitute 20% [Editor’s note: These figures have been corrected from a previous version of the article, in which figures were not properly weighted to the state’s overall religious demographics per the 2011 census].

  • Why is Assam having elections?

Like Bihar last year, Assam will be electing a Vidhan Sabha, or legislative assembly, to govern the state’s affairs. Assam’s Vidhan Sabha has 126 seats. Whichever party alliance can combined assemble 64 seats will have enough to back a government led by their named chief ministerial candidate. Once the chief minister has secured a majority of votes in the Vidhan Sabha, s/he will name a government of ministers. State governments hold office for five years if they are able to maintain a majority in the Vidhan Sabha.

  • When are the elections being held?

The elections are being held in two phases. In the first phase on April 4, 65 constituencies voted. In the second phase on April 11, the remaining 61 constituencies will have elections. The final results of the elections will be announced on May 19, along with the results of the elections in West Bengal, Puducherry, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu.

  • What are the stakes of this election at the national level?

The Indian National Congress (INC), which for many decades led the national government and many state governments, has been on a downward electoral slide over the past few years. This culminated in their embarrassing loss in 2014, in which the party was reduced to a historic low of forty seats in the Lok Sabha. After Karnataka and Kerala, Assam is the largest state governed by the INC. Losing it would be another embarrassment that shows the party’s diminishing appeal, following  on previous losses in head-to-head contests against the BJP in the 2014 elections of Haryana and Maharashtra. Another Congress loss to the BJP would further embolden other parties seeking to emerge as the national alternative to the BJP.

While successful in the most recent national elections and many state elections in the last few years, the BJP suffered two striking losses in last year’s elections in Delhi (to AAP) and Bihar (to a grand alliance of JD(U), RJD, and the INC). Prime Minister Modi and BJP President Amit Shah are eager to turn this narrative of losses around, especially with the crucial elections in Uttar Pradesh only a year away. Modi and Shah aim to extend their party’s advantage over INC in state and national politics, since the INC after all played only a minor role in the Delhi and Bihar elections.

  • What are the main parties contesting? What are their electoral strategies?

As in any Indian election, a multitude of political parties are contesting the polls. Three main alliances have emerged:

1) Indian National Congress (INC) – United People’s Party (UPP) alliance

Led by Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, who has led the state since 2001, the INC will be facing a tide of anti-incumbency after winning elections in 2001, 2006, and 2011. The Congress party in Assam faced a major rebellion last year, when minister Himanta Biswa Sarma left over the question of succession and joined the BJP along with nine other Congress members of the legislative assembly (MLAs). The weakened Congress government is hoping to focus on its record of development in Assam, and will be leaning heavily on its Assamese Muslim vote bank while also hoping to pull a significant share of votes from Assamese Hindus, Bengali Hindus, and the tea tribes.

While there was talk last year and earlier this year about a potential alliance between INC and the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), nothing emerged from such talks. The electoral calculation may be that a tie-up with the AIUDF, which speaks to the aspirations of the Bengali Muslims in the state, could hurt the INC with its traditional voters among the Assamese Hindu and Bengali Hindu communities.

Without any major allies, the INC will need to either win a majority of seats largely on its own or a definitive plurality that gives it a mandate to make alliances with other parties (most likely the AIUDF) after the election. Congress recently tied up an alliance with the United People’s Party (UPP), a recently-launched Bodo party, which will compete in four constituencies in the Bodoland Territorial Council areas.

The INC will contest 122 of Assam’s 126 seats, while the UPP will contest 4 seats.

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Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi

2) Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) – Bodoland People’s Front (BPF) alliance

This alliance is being led by the BJP’s union minister of youth affairs and sports, Sarbananda Sonowal. Sonowal, who belongs to the Sonowal tribe that is categorized as ST, was once a member of the AASU and the AGP. In contrast to the Bihar elections last year, in which Prime Minister Modi’s heavy involvement was deemed a strategic failure, the BJP will rely heavily on popular Assamese leaders. This includes Himanta Biswa Sarma, who is directing the BJP’s electoral strategy.

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Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal

The BJP is hoping to win a large share of the Assamese Hindu and Bengali Hindu vote in the state, which powered its win in half the Lok Sabha seats in the state in 2014. In previous elections, the BJP’s base consisted primarily of Bengali Hindus in the state, since the AGP and INC had cornered most of the Assamese Hindu vote. The 2014 Lok Sabha elections changed these dynamics when the BJP won seven seats while the AGP won zero.

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Himanta Biswa Sarma

Through their alliance with the AGP, the BJP will aim to unify the Hindu vote, as Hindus make up 62% of the state’s population. In order to appeal to both Assamese regional sentiment and Hindu religious sentiment, party spokesmen have been referring to the AIUDF, a Bengali Muslim outfit, as their main opponent instead of the INC. BJP talk of building a fenced border to keep out Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants also serves to highlight religious and ethnic differences and thereby consolidate the Hindu vote among both ethnic Assamese and Bengalis.

The BJP will also try to expand its vote among tribal communities. Six ethnic groups that currently have Other Backwards Class (OBC) status in Assam — Tai Ahoms, adivasis (also known as tea tribes), Koch Rajbongshis, Morans, Sooteas, and Motoks — are seeking Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to expand the educational and employment benefits provided to these communities. At the beginning of March, the BJP government in Delhi established a committee to recommend ST status for these communities by May, following through on a campaign promise from the 2014 national elections.

The BJP has also made a strategic alliance with the major Bodo party, the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF). After thirteen years in alliance with the INC government, the BPF broke their alliance in 2014 to tie up with the BJP for the upcoming state elections. As the predominant political force in the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) areas of north Assam, this was a coup for the BJP, since the BPF is likely to perform strongly in the BTC constituencies (they currently hold twelve constituencies).

Lastly, the AGP, for so long the vehicle of regionalist sentiment in Assam, decided to tie up with the BJP for this election cycle. As mentioned above, the AGP has faced a secular decline in vote share since the 1990s when they were at their peak strength. Their pre-poll alliance with the BJP is a recognition of their declining electoral strength in Assam.

In this alliance, the BJP will contest 84 seats, the BPF will contest 16 seats, and the AGP will contest 24 seats. Two other political parties representing tribal communities, the Rabha Jatiya Aika Manch  and the Tiwa Jatiya Aika Manch, will also be contesting 1 seat each under the BJP symbol.

3) All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) – Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) – Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) alliance

The All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) has emerged as a growing electoral force in the last decade. Established in 2005 by Badruddin Ajmal, a religious leader and scion of a wealthy perfume manufacturer family, the AIUDF has made itself the electoral home for Bengali Muslim votes in the states, winning the second-largest number of seats (18) in the Vidhan Sabha elections of 2011. The AIUDF’s increasing share of the Bengali Muslim vote has come largely at the expense of Congress. In 2014, AIUDF won three Lok Sabha seats in Assam, equalling Congress’ total in the state despite a lower vote share due to the geographic concentration of their supporters.

The AIUDF has been eager to frame itself as the major opposition force to the BJP in Assam. Though not in an official alliance with the Congress, the AIUDF will not be contesting seats in Upper Assam so as not to split the anti-BJP vote in this region. If the AIUDF-led alliance and Congress each win enough seats, it is possible that a coalition government could be brokered after the election.

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AIUDF leader Badruddin Ajmal

Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar, who led a successful grand alliance of the JD(U), RJD, and INC against the BJP in last year’s Bihar elections, tried to produce a similar alliance between the AGP, AIUDF, and Congress for Assam. No such alliance emerged, though JD(U) and RJD, which do not presently hold any seats in Assam’s Vidhan Sabha, ended up aligning themselves with the AIUDF. Both Kumar and Bihari political stalwart Lalu Yadav will be campaigning during the upcoming elections in an effort to establish a presence in Assam.

The AIUDF will contest 76 seats, while the JD(U) and RJD will each contest 12 seats.

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Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar

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RJD leader Lalu Yadav

The Left Front will collectively contest 59 constituencies in Assam: the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) will contest 19, the Community Party of India (CPI) will contest 18, the All India Forward Bloc (AIFB) will contest 10, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI(ML)) will contest 9, and the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and Revolutionary Communist Party of India (RCPI) will each contest 2 seats.

The All India Trina Mool Congress (AITMC), which presently governs in West Bengal, will also be contesting 25 seats separately.

  • Where does each party expect to perform well?

The infographic map below from Mint below examines where each party has performed well in the past two elections, the 2011 Vidhan Sabha elections and the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.

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The blue stripe in the upper left corner of the first map (Winner – 2011 AE) is Bodoland, and the BPF is likely to win these assembly constituencies again. The constituencies colored in yellow in these first two maps, where AIUDF won the largest share votes, are the areas where Bengali residents are most heavily concentrated: Lower Assam in the western pocket of the state and Barak Valley at the southern end. AIUDF will again be competing in these areas.

Note the mass of red in the second map (Winner – 2014 PE). This is Upper Assam, where Assamese Hindus and Muslims are concentrated, and the density of red shows that the BJP won this area decisively in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The AIUDF-led alliance will not compete in these constituencies so as not to split the anti-BJP vote with Congress.

The BJP knows that its strength lies in Upper Assam; its alliances will help most in Lower Assam. Without any major allies, Congress will be competing statewide and hopes that the upstart UPP might be able to delivering some Bodoland constituencies at the expense of BPF.

  • Who is going to win the election?

Conventional wisdom has been that Congress, facing strong anti-incumbent headwinds after fifteen years in government, is likely to lose a number of seats while the BJP is likely to emerge as the largest party in the state. BPF’s breaking of its alliance with Congress to join with the BJP after the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and the AGP’s recent addition to this alliance show that regional parties expect the BJP to have the upper hand once all the votes are counted.

Three polls by major survey organizations have been released so far. The first, conducted by CVoter (who, full disclosure, is one of my research affiliates) for India TV, projects the BJP-led alliance to expand its vote share (from 34% to 35%; note that the BPF did not contest with the BJP in 2011) and the Congress’ to shrink (from 39% to 36%). It does not project a majority for the BJP-led alliance, since 57 seats overall would be a few short of a majority. However, this poll was fielded before the addition of AGP to the BJP-led alliance and thus presents a favorable picture for the BJP.

At the beginning of April, CVoter released a new poll for Times Now showing similar results: the Congress alliance winning a vote share of 37%, BJP-led alliance alliance winning 35%, and the AIUDF-led alliance winning 12%. Based on the seat projections released with the poll, neither Congress nor the BJP would hold a majority of seats in the Vidhan Sabha. Such a scenario could make Badruddin Ajmal’s AIUDF the kingmaker in government formation negotiations.

A third poll conducted by ABP-Nielsen, and also fielded after the announcement of the BJP-BPF-AGP alliance, projects that the BJP-led alliance will win a sizable majority of 78 seats. It is noteworthy that in both the CVoter and ABP polls, Congress is projected to win significantly more seats than AIUDF.

However, we will not know the final results of the election until Kerala, Puducherry, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal have all voted by the middle of May. The results for all these state elections will be announced on May 19.

*Thanks to Pranav Gupta, Jyoti Mishra, and Rahul Verma for their reviews and comments.

Questions? Anything unclear or in need of further explanation? Please add any additional questions to the comments.